Entanglement-Enhanced Quantum Key Distribution by Ahonen, Olli
ar
X
iv
:0
90
3.
21
17
v1
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  1
2 M
ar 
20
09
Helsinki University of Technology
Faculty of Information and Natural Sciences
Department of Applied Physics
Licentiate Thesis
Entanglement-Enhanced Quantum Key
Distribution
Olli Ahonen
Supervisor: Acad. Prof. Risto Nieminen
Instructor: Doc. Mikko Mo¨tto¨nen
Otaniemi
February 21, 2009
Helsinki University of Technology Abstract
Author: Olli Ahonen
Faculty: Faculty of Information and Natural Sciences
Department: Department of Applied Physics
Research field: Engineering Physics, Theoretical and
Computational Physics
Title: Entanglement-Enhanced Quantum Key Distribution
Title in Finnish: Kietomalla kohennettu kvanttisalaus
Chair: Tfy-3 (Physics)
Supervisor: Academy Professor Risto Nieminen
Instructor: Docent Mikko Mo¨tto¨nen
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two spatially separated parties to
securely generate a cryptographic key. The first QKD protocol, published
by C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard in 1984 (BB84), describes how this is
achieved by transmitting individual qubits and exchanging classical authen-
ticated information. Any attempt to eavesdrop on the protocol introduces
errors detectable by the legitimate parties.
This Licentiate Thesis studies the recently introduced EEQKD protocol
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loss and quantum channel noise. In addition, an exquisite vulnerability
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C. H. Bennett ja G. Brassard julkaisivat vuonna 1984 BB84:ksi kutsutun
menetelma¨n, jolla toisistaan eta¨a¨lla¨ olevat osapuolet voivat luoda kryp-
tografisen avaimen. Menetelma¨ hyo¨dynta¨a¨ yksiqubittitilojen ominaisuuksia
ja autentikoitua klassisten viestien vaihtoa. Kaikki salakuunteluyritykset
voidaan havaita niiden va¨ista¨ma¨tta¨ aiheuttamien virheiden perusteella.
Ta¨ssa¨ lisensiaatintyo¨ssa¨ tutkitaan hiljattain esiteltya¨ EEQKD-kvanttiavai-
menjakomenetelma¨a¨. Sen sijaan, etta¨ yksitta¨isia¨ hiukkasia la¨hetetta¨isiin
erikseen kuten BB84:ssa¨, ne ryhmitella¨a¨n ja kiedotaan erityisella¨ muun-
noksella. Kietoutuneet hiukkaset la¨heteta¨a¨n toiselle osapuolelle siten,
etta¨ salakuuntelu rajoittuu yhteen hiukkaseen kerrallaan, joten se on
perustavanlaatuisesti rajoittunutta.
Tyo¨ssa¨ lasketaan sieppaus-uudelleenla¨hetys-hyo¨kka¨yksella¨ (SUH)
saatava maksimaalinen tieto avaimesta kvanttikanavassa aiheutetun
ha¨irio¨n funktiona. Salaisen avaimen muodostamisnopeus arvioidaan
ka¨yta¨nno¨n sovellusalaa vastaavissa olosuhteissa, joissa kvanttikanavassa
on seka¨ ha¨vio¨ta¨ etta¨ kohinaa. Lisa¨ksi na¨yteta¨a¨n, miten salakuuntelija
voi murtaa avaimenjaon BB84-tasolle, kun ka¨yteta¨a¨n era¨sta¨ kietovaa
muunnosta, joka taas tarjoaa eniten suojaa SUH:ta vastaan.
Osa tutkimuksesta on julkaistu artikkelissa O. Ahonen et al., Physical Re-
view A 78, 032314 (2008).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Quantum Cryptography
Cryptography is about concealing the meaning of exchanged messages from unin-
tended recipients. Today, strong methods are known for this task, such as the Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard [1]. All cryptographic methods not based on assump-
tions about the difficulty of certain computational tasks require a cryptographic
key, a relatively short random bit sequence known strictly only to the sender and
recipient of the messages. The drawback of these robust encryption methods is the
requirement of the pre-existing key.
Quantum cryptography, or synonymously quantum key distribution (QKD), ad-
dresses the difficulty of agreeing on a cryptographic key which fulfills the require-
ments of randomness and secrecy. In QKD, these requirements are met based on the
laws of quantum physics. Notable conceptions in this field include entanglement, the
no-cloning theorem, and the related effect of unavoidable disturbance of a quantum
state in acquiring any information about it. Entanglement—the correlation of dis-
tinct quantum states regardless of their distance inexplicable by classical physics—is
the main enabler of QKD in protocols such as that proposed by A. K. Ekert in 1991
(E91) [2]. Besides these so called entanglement-based protocols, the prepare-and-
measure scheme is another viable approach to QKD [3]. The 1984 protocol by C. H.
Bennet and G. Brassard (BB84) [4] represents the latter type, and carries the title
of the first QKD protocol. In BB84, the no-cloning theorem and the unavoidable
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disturbance of an unknown quantum state upon its measurement assert that the
key generated by transmission and measurement of qubits, quantum bits, is secure
after known classical post-processing steps. For a more extensive introduction to
quantum cryptography, see [5] and references therein.
This Licentiate Thesis studies the Entanglement-Enhanced Quantum Key Dis-
tribution (EEQKD) protocol first introduced by the author in Ref. [5] and further
analyzed in Ref. [6]. The protocol is reviewed briefly in the next section. The main
results of [5] and [6] are summarized in Ch. 2. Chapter 3 discusses the rate at which
actual key bits are generated by the protocol in a practical application environment.
Chapter 4 presents an attack specifically designed for the EEQKD protocol, and
shows that this attack reduces the EEQKD protocol, with certain parameter values,
to the BB84 scheme. A preliminary version of this attack was introduced in Ref. [5].
Finally, this study and its implications are summarized in Ch. 5.
1.2 The Protocol
The EEQKD protocol is a prepare-and-measure-type scheme based on the BB84
protocol. Entanglement in the protocol was designed not to guarantee the security,
which is already achieved with the underlying BB84 mechanisms, but to decrease
the information available to an attacker and thus increase the rate at which the
key is generated. This Thesis adopts the conventional terminology of QKD: The
initiator of the protocol is Alice, who wishes to establish a cryptographic key with
Bob. The attacker, or eavesdropper, Eve attempts to gain as much information on
the key as possible, without Alice or Bob detecting this.
Alice and Bob are connected by a quantum channel, i.e., Alice can send qubits
to Bob. An ideal quantum channel conveys the qubit and its precise state. Eve
is assumed to be in total control of the quantum channel. In addition, Alice and
Bob have an authenticated classical channel allowing them to exchange classical
information such that Eve can only read the messages. Figure 1.1 shows the general
setup.
The EEQKD protocol is executed as follows. Alice prepares an N -bit string
a = a1a2 · · · aN , where each ai ∈ {0, 1} is the outcome of the unbiased binary
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Eve
Alice Bob
E
Quantum channel
Classical channel
Figure 1.1: General setup of the EEQKD protocol. Alice and Bob use a two-way
classical channel and a one-way quantum channel. Eve has total control over the
quantum channel, whereas she can only listen to the classical channel.
random variable Ai. String a is the outcome of the composite N -bit random variable
A. A large number of such strings forms what is known as Alice’s raw key. Alice
prepares a group of states {|a1;α1〉, |a2;α2〉, · · · , |aN ;αN〉}, where each αi ∈ {z, x}
with uniform probability independently for each bit i. The states |ai; z〉 and |ai; x〉
are the distinct eigenstates of the Pauli matrices1 σz and σx, respectively. These z
and x bases are denoted {|0〉, |1〉} and {|+〉 = (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2, |−〉 = (|0〉− |1〉)/√2},
respectively. Up to this point, the protocol is identical to BB84.
Alice applies an N -qubit transformation UN to the prepared qubit group. She
then sends the qubits to Bob one by one, always delaying the transmission of the
next qubit until acknowledgement from Bob of reception, sent via the authenticated
classical channel. Bob can detect the reception of a qubit without disturbing its
state by a quantum nondemolition (QND) measurement (see e.g. [7]). Once Bob
has received and stored the N qubits, he applies U †N to the group. After this, the
protocol again proceeds as BB84.
Bob projectively measures each qubit in the eigenbasis of σz or σx, chosen indepen-
dently with uniform probability for each qubit. The measurement results bi ∈ {0, 1}
from a large number of groups form Bob’s raw key. The described quantum trans-
1The Pauli matrices are σx = |0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈0|, σy = −i|0〉〈1|+ i|1〉〈0|, and σz = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|
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|a1,α1>
|a2,α2>
Alice Eve Bob
b1
z/x
b2
z/x
|aN,αN> bN
z/x
UN UN
†
R(β1,γ1)
†
e1
z
e2
z
eN
z
R(β1,γ1)
R(β2,γ2)
†
R(βN,γN)
†
R(β2,γ2)
R(βN,γN)
Figure 1.2: Quantum circuit for the EEQKD protocol with an intercept-resend
attack. This circuit generates N raw key bits and is thus repeated as many times
as needed. Bob’s quantum nondemolition measurements, acknowledgement of qubit
reception, and single-qubit memory are not shown. Semicircles represent projective
measurements in the denoted bases. Gate R(β, γ) is a single-qubit rotation with
respect to axes y and z, respectively. The ei are bits in Eve’s view of Alice’s raw
key.
mission phase of the protocol is shown as a quantum circuit in Fig. 1.2. After the
measurements, Alice and Bob compare their basis choices over the classical authen-
ticated channel. They discard the bits in their raw keys corresponding to qubits
transmitted and measured in different bases. The remaining bits, for which the
transmission and measurement bases coincide, form the participants’ sifted keys.
The sifted keys may still differ due to noise or eavesdropping in the quantum
channel. Alice and Bob compare a small fraction of the keys, and based on the
observed differences obtain an estimate of the quantum bit error rate (QBER),
defined as the average probability of a bit flip in the sifted key. Classical error
correction procedures (see e.g. [8]) can be applied if the QBER is less than 15%.
If eavesdropping is suspected, Alice and Bob employ privacy amplification, which
allows them to reduce any eavesdropper’s information to an arbitrarily low value
while shortening the key. This results in the error-free and sufficiently secret final
key. For a QBER in the range 15–25% less efficient methods still exist for Alice and
Bob to arrive at a final key [9]. For an alternative and more verbose description of
the protocol model, see [5].
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1.3 Attacks
In any attacks against a QKD protocol, the attacker aims at acquiring as much infor-
mation on the key as possible, while inducing a minimal amount of errors detectable
to Alice and Bob. The results presented in Chs. 2 and 3 concern the EEQKD pro-
tocol under an intercept-resend (IR) attack. In the IR attack, Eve captures and
projectively measures each individual qubit and sends Bob the state correspond-
ing to her result. In BB84, Eve is able to guess correctly the basis used by Alice
with probability 1
2
, in which case she obtains the correct key bit value. Otherwise
she gains no information. During the comparison of transmission and measurement
bases, Eve learns for each qubit if she used the correct basis or not. This leads to
an average information of 0.5 bits on each sifted-key bit, and a QBER of 25% due
to the resent state being the correct one with probability 0.5 despite Eve’s incorrect
measurement basis. A detailed calculation is given in Ref. [5]. To induce a smaller
QBER, Even can choose to interfere only with a fraction ξ ∈ [0, 1] of the transmitted
qubits.
An incoherent attack is equivalent to Eve imperfectly cloning each transmitted
qubit and measuring the clone in the correct basis after receiving the basis infor-
mation from Alice [10]. Eve can adjust the fidelity of the clone state. The more
information she gains on the key, the more the QBER increases. For a QBER be-
low 25%, the incoherent attack provides Eve slightly more information than the IR
attack. Here, it is more beneficial for Eve to adjust the clone fidelity than to clone
only a fraction of the qubits. Figure 2.2 illustrates Eve’s information as a function
of the induced QBER for the attacks.
1.4 Lower Bound on Security
The security of the BB84 protocol has been proven against an eavesdropper with
unlimited quantum computing capabilities [11]. This means that Alice and Bob
can reliably estimate Eve’s amount of knowledge on the generated key, and they can
reduce this knowledge to an arbitrarily small value. The proof given in Ref. [11] holds
also for more restricted attacks such as IR and incoherent attacks. Furthermore, the
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proof assumes many realistic imperfections such as noise and loss in the quantum
channel.
One may ask whether the addition of gates UN and U
†
N to the BB84 scheme could
invalidate the security proof. From Fig. 1.2, it is immediate that in the worst case,
the added gates are completely under Eve’s control. But in this case, the circuit
represents BB84 under an attack with some N -qubit quantum computation, and
unconditional security for this setting has been proved. Therefore, EEQKD cannot
be less secure than BB84, in any setting. What is more, calculations of the final
bit rate, the rate at which bits are acquired for the final key, for BB84 also apply
to the EEQKD protocol, assuming an ideal quantum channel. That is, in the ideal
setting, EEQKD cannot perform worse than BB84. Noise and loss in the quantum
channel can, however, change this as is shown in Ch. 3.
Chapter 2
Information Gain of the
Intercept-Resend Attack
This Chapter studies the relationship between Eve’s knowledge on the generated key
and the QBER that Alice and Bob observe in the EEQKD protocol. Eve is assumed
to employ the IR attack, and allowed to perform the included measurements in any
basis. A definite upper bound to Eve’s information is obtained for a given QBER.
The calculations and results of this Chapter were published in Ref. [6]. Most of the
calculations are laid out in more detail in Ref. [5].
2.1 Attacker’s Information
Let e = e1e2 · · · eN , with each ei ∈ {0, 1}, denote the outcomes of Eve’s measure-
ments for the entangled group of N qubits. The bit string e is the outcome of the
random variable E. Eve is allowed measurements in any basis, which is equivalent
to allowing her arbitrary single-qubit gates and measurements in the z basis. Any
single-qubit gate can be decomposed to Bloch-sphere rotations about the axes y
and z followed by a phase shift by φ as eiφRz(ϕ)Ry(β)Rz(γ). To implement an
arbitrary measurement basis, Eve performs a suitable rotation sequence prior to the
measurement. Since Eve measures in the z basis, the final rotation as well as the
phase shift are irrelevant. To minimize the induced disturbance, Eve performs the
opposite rotations after the measurement which can be assumed projective. Hence,
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Eve sends qubit i in the state
|ΨEvei (β, γ)〉 = [Ry(β)Rz(γ)]†|ei; z〉, (2.1)
to Bob. If Eve had somehow learned of another state leading to less errors at Bob’s
end, she would have obtained information on the key bit by some other means
than the measurement. For individual unentangled qubits, this is not possible and
resending |ΨEvei (β, γ)〉 is the optimal strategy for Eve. In EEQKD, however, the
optimal state may depend on Eve’s earlier measurement results of the same group.
We therefore state that this is a good IR attack strategy for Eve, but optimality
cannot be claimed. This IR attack in EEQKD is shown in Fig. 1.2.
The random variables A and E allow us to precisely quantify Eve’s information on
the raw key. Since Eve learns which bits of the raw key contribute to the sifted key,
her knowledge on the sifted key is directly described, as well. The per-bit mutual
information of A and E is [12]
I(A,E) =
1
N
[H(A) +H(E)−H(A,E)], (2.2)
where H(·) denotes the Shannon entropy and H(·, ·) the joint entropy. The mutual
information or alternatively the entropies are averaged over Alice’s basis choices
α = α1α2 · · ·αN which Eve learns during the sifting. The entropies are thus written
as
H(E) =
1
2N
∑
α
Hα(E) = − 1
2N
∑
α,e
p(e|α) log2 p(e|α), (2.3)
and
H(A,E) =
1
2N
∑
α
Hα(A,E) = − 1
2N
∑
α,a,e
p(a, e|α) log2 p(a, e|α). (2.4)
The entropy of A is constant, H(A) = N .
2.2 Quantum Bit Error Rate
The quantum bit error rate is defined as the average probability of a different value
of one bit, a bit flip, in Alice’s and Bob’s sifted keys. For each qubit of the N qubits
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in a group, the QBER is
QBERj =
1
4
x∑
αj=z
1∑
aj=0
p(Bj = a¯j |Aj = aj;αj), j = 1, . . . , N, (2.5)
where Bj is the random variable describing Bob’s measurement of the jth qubit,
and the bar denotes a bit flip, i.e., the logical not operation. In the following, the
QBER q is the average of the single-qubit QBER’s.
In practice, Alice and Bob cannot demand that they always observe a zero QBER,
since various mechanisms of noise in the quantum channel typically lead to q being
in the range 1–10% even without eavesdropping [13–16]. Hence, Alice and Bob must
tolerate a finite QBER. Only if q is significantly larger than the estimated value for
the equipment and the channel, can they be certain that the transmission is being
eavesdropped. In the IR attack, this means that Eve adjusts the fraction ξ suitable
for inducing the QBER that Alice and Bob expect. Since it is quite possible for Eve
to replace a noisy channel with a noiseless one and induce all of the observed QBER
by eavesdropping, Alice and Bob must attribute all errors to Eve. For a given value
of q, Eve’s maximal information is thus determined by the maximum of the ratio
I(A,E)/q.
2.3 Two-Qubit Entanglement: Results
This section shows Eve’s maximal information for a given QBER in the case N = 2,
i.e., two-qubit entanglement. Gate U2 is decomposed as
U2 = C(c)(k1,1 ⊗ k1,2) = exp
[
i
2
(c1 σx ⊗ σx + c2 σy ⊗ σy + c3 σz ⊗ σz)
]
(k1,1 ⊗ k1,2),
(2.6)
where c = (c1, c2, c3) ∈ [0, 2π]×3 together with the arbitrary single-qubit gates k1,l
parametrize the relevant two-qubit gates [5]. In addition, we set k1,1 = k1,2, relaxing
of which can only decrease Eve’s maximal information.
Figure 2.1 shows a full sweep over the parameter space c ∈ [0, 2π]×3 when Eve
uses the IR attack in z basis, without single-qubit gates. The upper set of points
corresponds to Eve measuring both qubits, and the lower to Eve measuring only
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one of them. As one moves from the topmost to the undermost point of each set,
the protocol shifts from BB84, where U2 is the identity operator, to the maximally
entangling EEQKD protocol with
U2 = C
(
0,
π
2
, 0
)
= (I1 ⊗ I1 + iσy ⊗ σy) /
√
2, (2.7)
where I1 is the single-qubit identity operator. It is interesting to note that with
this gate, Eve’s information is strictly zero if she intercepts only one of the qubits.
Furthermore, it remains zero for any measurement basis. Let U⋆2 denote this gate.
If Eve measures both qubits, one in basis σz and the other in σy, her mutual in-
formation is 0.25, and the QBER is 0.375, which is optimal for Eve. Gate U⋆2 is
generalized to N qubits in Sec. 2.4.
Figure 2.1: Eve’s information on the key and the induced QBER for different gates
U2. Eve uses the IR attack measuring in the z basis. In the upper set, where both
qubits are intercepted, the information is in the range 0.125–0.5. In the lower set,
Eve intercepts only one of the qubits, and her information ranges from 0 to 0.25.
In the following, Eve is allowed to choose her measurement bases freely. To obtain
the optimal U2, one needs to solve the twofold optimization problem of Alice and
Bob minimizing Eve’s maximal information for a given QBER. In other words,
the problem is to find mincmax{β1,γ1,β2,γ2} [I(A,E)/q] and the optimizing parameter
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values. There are several parameter values solving the problem. One of the optimal
values for Alice and Bob is
c∗ =
(
π
32
,
3π
8
,
π
32
)
. (2.8)
This yields I(A,E) ≈ 0.2237 and q = 0.375, if ξ = 1 and if Eve uses her correspond-
ing optimal values (β1, γ1, β2, γ2) =
(
pi
8
, 0, pi
2
, pi
2
)
. Figure 2.2 shows Eve’s maximal
information as a function of the observed QBER given U2 = C(c
∗). The informa-
tion provided by an IR attack in the BB84 protocol is also shown, its explicit formula
is I(A,E) = 2q.
Figure 2.2: Eve’s maximal information on the key as a function of the QBER Alice
and Bob observe. Eve uses the IR attack choosing measurement bases freely (blue
lines) or the cloning attack (red dashed line). The dashed lines correspond to BB84
and the solid line to the EEQKD protocol with the optimal gate U2 = C
(
pi
32
, 3pi
8
, pi
32
)
.
The arrow shows how the setting changes from BB84 when the fraction of intercepted
qubits ξ is held constant. For a QBER below 25%, Eve’s information is decreased
by more than 70%.
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2.4 Gate Construction for N Qubits
Let us generalize the gate U⋆2 , which produces nearly optimal results for Alice and
Bob in the two-qubit case, to an arbitrary number of entangled qubits N . Let U⋆N
denote this generalized gate. There are two equivalent choices of different parity
for the gate for each value of N . We denote them U⋆N,even and U
⋆
N,odd, both of
which produce the same maximal information for Eve. We define U⋆1,even = I1 and
U⋆1,odd = σy. The (N + 1)-qubit gate is obtained with the recursive formula
U⋆N+1 =
1√
2
[
I1 ⊗ U⋆N ± iσy ⊗
(
PNU
⋆
N
)]
, (2.9)
where PN = σy ⊗ I⊗N−11 if N ≥ 2 and P1 = σy. Either of the two signs can be
chosen independently for each step. For instance, the gate given in Eq. (2.7) is
of even parity, U⋆2,even, and produced by the application of the upper sign in the
formula. The gate U⋆N restricts the information gained by any IR attack to at most
1/(2N). A proof of this is given in the Appendix in Ref. [6].
Chapter 3
Key Generation Rate
This chapter studies the rate at which the EEQKD protocol allows Alice and Bob
to generate bits for the final key. This final bit rate is arguably the most important
figure for a QKD protocol once unconditional security has been proven [9]. After
all, in a practical setting, one would prefer to generate the key as fast as possible or,
alternatively, use the least necessary technological resources to achieve the required
key generation rate. Throughout this chapter, Eve is assumed to use the IR attack
described in Sec. 2.1.
3.1 Relative Key Rate
Since the actual final bit rate Rnet, measured in bits per second, heavily depends on
the equipment chosen for the realization of the protocol, we use the relative key rate
r = Rnet/Rsift, where Rsift is the rate at which sifted key bits are generated. The
relative key rate thus reflects the capability of a protocol to deliver secret, error-
free bits, independent of the used technology. It allows for the comparison of QKD
protocols without regard to any specific implementation.
The exact relative key rate depends on the error correction and privacy amplifica-
tion procedures applied to the sifted key. It is also a function of the amount of errors
and their possible correlations in the key, as well as of the amount and structure of
the information that Eve may have on the key [17]. Therefore, calculation of the
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exact value of r requires detailed knowledge and assumptions of the protocol and
the participants’ actions during its execution.
Since we do not wish to fix every smallest detail of the entire key distribution
procedure, we take the information-theoretic approach [18] to obtain an estimate of
the relative key rate r. In this paragraph, we follow Ref. [9]. The relative key rate
is determined by the difference of Bob’s and Eve’s knowledge of Alice’s sifted key as
r = Rnet/Rsift = I(A,B)− I(A,E). (3.1)
A non-positive key rate given by this formula might, in some cases, be circumvented
by advanced techniques. Equation (3.1), however, suffices for our purposes. Errors
in the quantum channel decrease the correlation of Bob’s and Alice’s sifted keys.
Thus,
I(A,B) = 1−Hbin(q), (3.2)
where the binary entropy
Hbin(q) = −q log2 q − (1− q) log2(1− q), (3.3)
and finally,
r(q) = 1− I(A,E)−Hbin(q). (3.4)
In the BB84 scheme, the relative key rate with an IR attack is
rBB84(q) = 1− 2q −Hbin(q). (3.5)
For the EEQKD protocol, Eve’s information provided by an IR attack as a function
of the QBER q is determined by the slope s of the line shown in Fig. 2.2, i.e.,
s = max [I(A,E)/q], where the maximization is over Eve’s parameters for a given
gate UN . We denote the observed QBER in EEQKD by qE = δq, and let q denote
the QBER which the innocent noise of the quantum channel induces with BB84.
Below, it is demonstrated that the coefficient δ ≥ 1, i.e., entangling successive qubits
for transmission can only increase the innocent error rate. The relative key rate is
rUN (q) = 1− sqE −Hbin(qE), (3.6)
because Alice and Bob must assume that all errors are due to Eve.
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It is convenient to view the effects of different gates U2 with reference to a fixed
value of q. For this purpose, we define qref = 6%, which is a typical value for
the QBER in a BB84-type scheme [13–16]. This value yields a relative key rate of
rBB84(qref) = 0.553.
Figure 3.1 shows the relative key rate for the optimized gate U2 = C
(
pi
32
, 3pi
8
, pi
32
)
which yields s = 0.5965 (see Ch. 2). For comparison, the dashed blue line shows
the rate for a protocol with s = 0. This ideal protocol demonstrates how much
the general structure of the EEQKD protocol could possibly improve r over the
BB84 scheme. It provides Eve with no information in the quantum transmission
phase, that is, its line would, in Fig. 2.2, lie on the horizontal axis. The key rate of
the ideal protocol is equal to that of BB84 at δ = 1.555. Therefore, any gate UN
that leads to δ > 1.555 will inevitably perform worse than the plain BB84 scheme,
unless additional analysis and processing is applied. For the optimized protocol with
U2 = C
(
pi
32
, 3pi
8
, pi
32
)
, the condition for better performance is δ < 1.323. The QBER
is fixed at qref .
3.2 Quantum Channel Imperfections
The realization of a quantum channel for QKD has two main alternatives: optical
fiber and the Earth’s atmosphere. The creation of a qubit in a suitable state and
its detection at Bob’s end can be implemented in various ways in both alternatives.
Most qubit creation methods employ either an attenuated laser or parametric down-
conversion. Avalanche photodiodes are the most common choice for detecting the
qubit state. [19]
Both fiber and atmosphere have two major drawbacks for QKD protocols: The
quantum channel may lose a qubit altogether, or the state of the qubit may be altered
such that Bob receives some other state than which Alice sent. These processes
form the innocent noise of the quantum channel—noise present even without Eve.
The process of qubit loss is also known as damping or attenuation. In fiber and
in good atmospheric conditions, the damping is approximately –0.21 dB/km. Poor
conditions in the atmosphere can raise the damping to a devastating –20 dB/km [19].
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Figure 3.1: Relative key rate as a function of the coefficient δ by which the use
of an entangling gate changes the observed QBER. The QBER in BB84 is fixed
to qref = 6%. The EEQKD protocol is shown in solid line for U2 = C(c
∗). The
blue dashed line shows the maximal rate for the EEQKD protocol, corresponding to
s = 0. The relative key rate of the BB84 protocol is 0.553, shown in red dash-dotted
line. The vertical green dotted lines mark δ for the gate U⋆2 with noise operators
Nxyz and Nxz.
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Change of the qubit state during transmission contributes to the QBER, for which
typical values range from 1% to 10% [13–16].
Let us quote the damping values reported in a recent QKD experiment carried
out over a distance of 144 km in the atmosphere [16]. The total damping for single
photons in the channel was typically –30 dB, which means that only 0.1% of photons
transmitted reached the detector at Bob’s end. The atmosphere contributed between
–8 and –12 dB, photons not hitting the receiver between –10 and –16 dB, and optics
–2 dB in total. The atmospheric damping is thus –0.07 dB/km. For instance, with
the setup of [16], a distance of 10 km would lead to a damping of –(0.7 dB + 2 dB)
≈ –3 dB, which means that only half of the qubits would reach Bob’s detectors, on
average.
3.3 Effect of Noise
To obtain an estimate for the coefficient δ by which the EEQKD protocol increases
the QBER relative to BB84, we assume that the quantum channel acts indepen-
dently on each transmitted qubit with one of the two unitary noise operators
Nxyz(n) = [(1− n)I1 + n(σx + σy + σz)]/
√
4n2 − 2n+ 1, (3.7)
and
Nxz(n) = [(1− n)I1 + n(σx + σz)]/
√
3n2 − 2n+ 1, (3.8)
where n is the amplitude of the noise.
With the noise operator Nxyz(n), we obtain a mapping between the QBER in the
BB84 scheme q and the amplitude n through numerical calculation. The mapping
is shown in Table 3.1. Once the amplitude n is known for each value of q, it is
straightforward to calculate the corresponding QBER in EEQKD, qE = δq. Note
that δ and thus qE depend on the gate UN chosen by Alice and Bob.
3.3.1 Gate U⋆2
Let us study the gate U⋆2 , defined in Sec. 2.3, under the above noise operators in
more detail. Numerical calculation shows that the coefficient δ is exactly 2(1 − q)
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Table 3.1: Mapping between the amplitude n of the quantum channel noise operator
Nxyz(n) and the QBER the operator induces in the BB84 scheme.
q 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 25% 50%
n 0.0922 0.1274 0.1537 0.1758 0.1952 0.2129 0.3091 0.5000
and thus the resulting QBER due to noise is
qnoiseE = 2(q − q2), (3.9)
provided that the noise operator is Nxyz(n). For the noise operator Nxz(n), the
calculation yields an even higher QBER, namely
qnoiseE = 3q − 4q2. (3.10)
For the highest sensible error rate value q = 0.5, both operators yield qnoiseE = 0.5,
as is expected. If q = qref , the coefficient is δ = 1.88 for the operator Nxyz(n) and
δ = 2.76 for Nxz(n). These values are shown in Fig. 3.1, which demonstrates that
the relative key rate is lower than that of BB84, if q = qref .
The relative key rate is
r
U⋆
2
(q) = 1− 2
3
qE −Hbin(qE), (3.11)
since the maximized slope is s = 0.25
0.375
= 2
3
. The rate is plotted in Fig. 3.2 as a funtion
of q for the two defined noise operators. The BB84 scheme, shown in dashed line in
Fig. 3.2, yields a positive key rate up to q = 17.05%. Gate U⋆2 yields a positive rate
if q < 15.36% or q < 10.00% for quantum channel noise given by Nxyz(n) or Nxz(n),
respectively. The rate is, however, lower than that of BB84.
A positive key rate is possible with BB84 up to q = 25%, in which case more
complex methods of quantum privacy amplifiction or classical advantage distillation
must be used [9]. Whether the same holds for gate U⋆2 , or for the EEQKD protocol
in general, remains to be studied.
If qubit loss remains at a tolerable level, it is possible that the EEQKD protocol
with gate U⋆2 performs better than the BB84 scheme at large error rates. Unfortu-
nately, the practical situation for QKD at present is the opposite: Qubit loss is very
high, of the order of 0.999, and the error rate is quite small.
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Figure 3.2: Relative key rate under quantum channel noise for the gate U⋆2 as a
function of the QBER in BB84. The rate for the BB84 scheme is shown in dashed
line, it is positive for q < 17.05%. The upper blue line corresponds to the noise being
due to operator Nxyz, and the lower red line due to Nxz. The rates are positive for
q < 15.36% and q < 10.00%, respectively.
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3.4 Effect of Qubit Loss
In the BB84 scheme, the effect of qubit loss is to simply reduce the amount of bits
in the sifted key by one for every photon lost in the quantum channel. In EEQKD
however, the loss of one qubit in general affects the other entangled N − 1 qubits,
as well. Thus, qubit loss increases the QBER of the remaining qubits.
This section studies the effect of qubit loss in the case where exactly half of the
transmitted qubits are lost in the quantum channel. This roughly corresponds to a
transmission distance of 10km, as discussed in Sec. 3.2. We also make the reasonable
assumption that the probability of loss, 0.5, is uniform and independent for each
qubit. For simplicity, we set N = 2, i.e., study two-qubit entanglement.
If qubit loss is 50%, the probability for a qubit pair, entangled or not, to lose both
of its qubits is 0.5× 0.5 = 0.25. Symmetrically, the probability that neither qubit is
lost is 0.25. The probability to lose exactly one qubit is 0.5. Entanglement between
the qubits does not affect loss, as is demonstrated by the expected number of lost
qubits: 2× 0.25 + 1× 0.5 = 1 for a pair of qubits.
Entanglement does, however, affect the change of the state of the remaining qubit
if exactly one qubit is lost. Let qloss denote the QBER of the remaining qubit due to
loss of the other. Let us optimistically assume that quantum channel noise induces
the same QBER as in BB84, denoted q, for the remaining qubit. The total QBER
of the remaining qubit is obtained as the exclusive-or of the two probabilities qloss
and q. It is
qtotloss = q + qloss − 2qqloss. (3.12)
That is, a bit flip is due to noise or loss of the other qubit, but not both (since then
the bit value would be correct). Only half of the transmitted qubit pairs lose exactly
one qubit. The qubit pairs transmitted without loss contribute two bits per pair to
the raw key. Their QBER qnoiseE may differ from q. The overall average QBER is
thus
qE = (q
noise
E + q + qloss − 2qqloss)/2. (3.13)
To simulate the effect of qubit loss, Bob may be assumed to replace each lost qubit
with a constant state, e.g., |0〉.
3.4 Effect of Qubit Loss 21
Figure 3.3 shows qE for different values of the gate parameter c2. This specific
parameter was chosen because varying it between 0 and pi
2
covers most of the relevant
gates UN and corresponds to a shift from the BB84 scheme to using gate U
⋆
2 . The
other two parameters are fixed to c1 = c3 = 0. Noise is given by Eq. (3.7). For
q = 0, shown in dashed line, the overall average QBER increases from 0 to 25%. For
q = qref , shown in solid line, qE increases from qref to 30.64%. The dash-dotted line
corresponds to q = 10%, and yields a qE between 10% and 34.00%. With U
⋆
2 , the
effect of qubit loss is devastating: The remaining qubit of a pair of which the other
qubit is lost, is completely scrambled, i.e., qloss = 0.5. For the optimized gate C(c
∗)
defined in Sec. 2.3, qE = 21.37% for q = 0 and qE = 26.86% for q = 6%. To conclude,
the error rate induced by qubit loss can be very high and can thus decrease the key
rate in EEQKD significantly, in addition to decrease due to quantum channel noise.
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Figure 3.3: Total average QBER as a function of the gate parameter c2 for 50%
qubit loss. The other gate parameters c1 = c3 = 0. The QBER in BB84 is zero for
the blue dashed line, 6% for the red solid line, and 10% for the black dash-dotted
line. At c2 = 0, the protocol is equivalent to BB84, and at c2 = π/2 ≈ 1.57, the
gate is U⋆2 .
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3.5 Optimizing the Key Rate
3.5.1 Rate without Qubit Loss
We maximize the two-qubit relative key rate rU2(q) for various values of the BB84
QBER q. The optimization is performed over the entangling gate parameters c. The
slope s is the maximum obtained by optimization over Eve’s parameters. Quantum
channel noise, given by Eq. (3.7), is taken into account with the approach described
in Sec. 3.3. We assume no loss of qubits in the quantum channel.
In addition to random initial values of c and random identical single-qubit gates
before gate C(c), we start the optimization at U2 = I2 (the BB84 scheme), at
U2 = U
⋆
2 , and at c = c
∗. We iterate the optimization for this array of initial values
over the q values of 2%, 4%, 6%, 8%, 10%, 12%, and 25%.
For all the employed values of q, gate C
(
pi
4
, pi
4
, pi
4
)
yields the highest relative key
rate. Figure 3.4 shows the rate for this gate for the various values of q, denoted with
circles, and for BB84 in blue dashed line. For q = 25%, the optimal gate yields a
key rate of −0.02. The negativity of the rate is a symptom of the fact that more
advanced post-processing methods are required, even in the plain BB84 scheme.
This setting is, however, irrelevant in the practical situation, where the QBER is
significantly lower.
3.5.2 Rate with Qubit Loss
We repeat the optimization procedures described in the previous section for a lossy
quantum channel. We use Eq. (3.13), i.e., take into account quantum channel noise,
given by Eq. (3.7), and qubit loss, which is fixed to 50%.
For QBER’s in the range 2-12%, the optimization did not reveal any gates which
would yield a higher key rate than BB84; successful maximizations terminated at the
gate being the identity operator. For q = 25%, we were able to find a gate yielding
a key rate of −0.16, which is higher than that for BB84. Again, the negativity of
the rate shows that more advanced post-processing methods are required for large
values of QBER.
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Figure 3.4: Relative key rate as a function of the QBER in BB84. Quantum channel
noise is given by the operator Nxyz(n), and no qubit loss is assumed. The circles
denote the rate for the optimal gate C
(
pi
4
, pi
4
, pi
4
)
at the discrete values of QBER for
which the rate was maximized, and the solid line is drawn to guide the eye. The
BB84 scheme is shown in blue dashed line.
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3.5.3 Correlated Bit Errors
For highly entangling gates, the bit errors of an entangled pair are expected to be
correlated. Let us optimistically assume that the errors are fully correlated. Then,
the amount of bits exchanged, and thus disclosed to Eve, in the error correction
phase is halved. This is reflected in the relative key rate as
rcorrU2 (q) = 1− sqE −
1
2
Hbin(qE), (3.14)
since Eve’s information is now sqE+
1
2
Hbin(qE), the sum of information obtained via
eavesdropping and by listening to the classical error correction procedure [17].
We repeat the optimization procedures described in Sec. 3.5.1 with the assumption
of a 50% qubit loss and using the key rate given by Eq. (3.14). The end result is the
same as in Sec. 3.5.2: For a QBER in the range 2-12%, BB84 yields the highest key
rate, and for q = 25%, there is a non-identity gate yielding the highest rate. The
latter is achieved approximately at c = (0.11, 0.89, 0.10), with a relative key rate of
0.30. This gate, however, gives no particular justification to assume full correlation
of errors in the entangled qubit pair.
Correlation of errors is not a reasonable assumption with BB84, either. Let us
therefore compare the relative key rate of Eq. (3.14) for gate U⋆2 , which is expected
to provide at least some correlation of errors, with the rate of Eq. (3.5) for the BB84
scheme. Figure 3.5 shows these rates as a function of q, assuming quantum channel
noise given by Eq. (3.7) and a 50% qubit loss. Gate U⋆2 assuming full correlation
of errors is shown in red solid line, while BB84 assuming no correlation is shown
in black dash-dotted line. The former yields a higher key rate for approximately
q > 10.5%. The rate also seems to remain positive when the QBER increases. The
blue dashed line shows the rate for U⋆2 without any correlation of errors. This rate
is negative for approximately q > 1%.
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Figure 3.5: Relative key rate as a function of the QBER in BB84. Quantum channel
noise is given by the operator Nxyz(n), and qubit loss is fixed to 50%. The rate for
gate U⋆2 assuming full correlation of errors in qubit pairs is shown in red solid line
and without any correlation of errors in blue dashed line. The BB84 scheme, without
any correlation of errors, is shown in black dash-dotted line. The BB84 scheme yields
a higher key rate for approximately q < 10.5%.
Chapter 4
Entanglement-Enhanced Attacks
This chapter presents the entanglement-enhanced (EE) attack against the EEQKD
protocol for two- and three-qubit entanglement. The attack is based on Eve locally
manipulating entangled qubits, one or more of which are already in Bob’s possession.
For the gates U⋆2 and U
⋆
3 , defined in Sec. 2.4, the EE attack reduces the EEQKD
protocol to BB84. Here, Eve utilizes N -qubit entanglement to fully counteract the
restriction posed by Alice and Bob’s use of N -qubit entanglement. The two-qubit
EE attack was partially developed in Ref. [5].
The technological requirements for the attack are a subset of those for Alice and
Bob. Eve needs to utilize short-term quantum memory, perform projective measure-
ments as well as quantum non-demolition measurements to detect the presence of
an intercepted qubit. In addition, Eve needs to apply single-qubit gates chosen from
a small set of gates, and she needs to be able to repeatedly construct a constant
entangled state of two or three qubits. The latter requirements translate to the
application of a local N -qubit gate and to applying an entangling N -qubit gate to
a constant state.
4.1 Two-Qubit Protocol
For clarity of presentation and without loss of generality, we assume that Alice and
Bob have chosen U⋆+2,even as the gate U
⋆
2 . The superscript ’+’ denotes the sign chosen
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in Eq. (2.9). Changing the parity or the sign of U⋆2 is accommodated by straight-
forward changes of sign and bit value in Eve’s actions. The states transmitted by
Alice are
U⋆2 |a1;α1〉|a2;α2〉 =
[|a1a2〉 ± (−1)a1+a2i|a¯1a¯2〉] /√2, (4.1)
where the upper sign is chosen if and only if α1 6= α2. The bases α1 and α2 are
unchanged, and omitted to enhance readability on the right-hand side of Eq. (4.1).
Furthermore, we have employed the notation |ψ〉 ⊗ |ϕ〉 = |ψ〉|ϕ〉 = |ψϕ〉.
4.1.1 Obtaining the Qubit Pair
To begin the attack, Eve captures the first, i.e., left-slot, qubit of the state in
Eq. (4.1) and stores it in quantum memory. She then sends the left-slot qubit of the
EPR state
|Eve02〉 = (|0〉|0〉 − i|1〉|1〉) /
√
2 (4.2)
to Bob, who acknowledges receiving it, thus triggering Alice to send the second,
right-slot, qubit of the state in Eq. (4.1) to Eve. Having received both qubits, Eve
applies U
⋆†
2 to the qubit pair, and is now in possession of the state |a1;α1〉|a2;α2〉.
4.1.2 Measurement and Entangled-State Reconstruction
Eve measures the product-state qubits in the σz eigenbasis. Depending on the
individual results e1 and e2 from the left- and right-slot qubits, respectively, Eve
applies the single-qubit operator
Ee1e2 = (−iσy)e2(iσx)e1, (4.3)
to the right-slot qubit of Eq. (4.2). She then sends this qubit to Bob, who has the
state
(I1 ⊗ Ee1e2) |Eve02〉 =
(|e1e2〉 − (−1)e1+e2i|e¯1e¯2〉) /√2. (4.4)
That is, Eve is able to send the state U⋆2 |e1; z〉|e2; z〉 to Bob.
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4.1.3 Mutual Information and QBER
Bob applies U
⋆†
2 to the received entangled qubit pair, hence obtaining the state
|e1; z〉|e2; z〉. This shows that the EEQKD protocol has been reduced to BB84, and
the effect of the attack is the same as an IR attack in BB84. With probability 1
4
, the
bases α1 = α2 = z and Eve gains full information on the bit values while inducing
no errors. With probability 1
2
, exactly one of the two bases is z and Eve gains 0.5
information and induces a 25% QBER, on average. With probability 1
4
, the bases
α1 = α2 = x, in which case Eve gains no information and induces an average QBER
of 50%. The expected values of information gain and QBER are thus 0.5 and 25%,
respectively.
4.2 Three-Qubit Protocol
For clarity of presentation and without loss of generality, we again assume that Alice
and Bob have chosen U⋆+3,even as the gate U
⋆
3 . Changing the parity or the signs of U
⋆
3
is accommodated by straightforward changes of sign and bit value in Eve’s actions.
In this case, Alice transmits states
U⋆3 |a1;α1〉|a2;α2〉|a3;α3〉 =
1
2
[|a1a2a3〉 ± (−1)a2+a3i|a1a¯2a¯3〉 ± (−1)a1+a2i|a¯1a¯2a3〉 ∓ (−1)a1+a3 |a¯1a2a¯3〉] , (4.5)
where the upper sign is chosen for the second term iff α2 6= α3, for the third term
iff α1 6= α2, and for the fourth term iff α1 6= α3. The bases α1, α2, and α3 are
unchanged, and again omitted to enhance readability on the right-hand side of
Eq. (4.5).
4.2.1 Processing the First Two Qubits
To begin the attack, Eve captures the left-slot qubit of the state in Eq. (4.5) and
stores it in quantum memory. She then sends the left-slot qubit of the state
|Eve03〉 =
1
2
(|0〉|0〉|0〉 − i|0〉|1〉|1〉 − i|1〉|1〉|0〉+ |1〉|0〉|1〉) , (4.6)
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to Bob, who acknowledges receiving it, thus triggering Alice to send the second,
middle-slot, qubit of the state in Eq. (4.5) to Eve. Having received the first two
qubits, Eve applies to them the operation −(σy ⊗ I1)U⋆+2,even. The full operation
applied to the initial product state |a1;α1〉|a2;α2〉|a3;α3〉 so far is
{[−(σy ⊗ I1)U⋆2,even]⊗ I1}U⋆3 = (I1 ⊗ I1 ⊗ σy − iI1 ⊗ σy ⊗ I1) /√2 = I1 ⊗ U⋆−2,odd.
(4.7)
Therefore, the first, left-slot, qubit of the transmitted state is unentangled from
the other two. This enables Eve to measure the first qubit in the z basis without
interfering the last two qubits. Eve stores the received middle-slot qubit in quantum
memory. If and only if the result e1 of the first measurement is 1, Eve applies σz to
the middle-slot qubit of Eq. (4.6). She then sends the qubit to Bob.
4.2.2 Processing the Last Two Qubits
Bob’s reception of the second, middle-slot qubit, triggers Alice to send the last,
right-slot qubit to Eve. As shown in Eq. (4.7), the last two qubits are now in state
U⋆−
2,odd|a2;α2〉|a3;α3〉. Eve applies U⋆ − †2,odd to this state, and measures the qubits
|a2;α2〉 and |a3;α3〉 in the z basis. Let e2 and e3 denote the measurement results,
respectively.
The single-qubit gate to be applied to the last qubit of Eq. (4.6) depends on all
three results e1, e2, and e3. If e1 = 0, the operation is equal to that of the two-qubit
case, (−iσy)e2(iσx)e1. If e1 = 1, the operation is iσy(−iσy)e3(−iσx)e2. Hence, the
full operation applied to the state |Eve03〉 is
Ee1e2e3 = I1 ⊗ (σz)e1 ⊗ [δe1,0(−iσy)e3(iσx)e2 + δe1,1iσy(−iσy)e3(−iσx)e2] , (4.8)
where δr,v is the Kronecker delta. These single-qubit operations allow Eve to send
the state U⋆3 |e1; z〉|e2; z〉|e3; z〉 to Bob.
4.2.3 Mutual Information and QBER
Bob applies U
⋆†
3 to the received entangled qubit triplet, and thus obtains the state
|e1; z〉|e2; z〉|e3; z〉. This shows that the EEQKD protocol has been reduced to BB84,
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and the effect of the attack is the same as an IR attack in BB84. The calculation
of Eve’s mutual information and the induced QBER is similar to that presented in
Sec. 4.1.3. On average, Eve gains 0.5 bits of information per key bit and induces an
average QBER of 25%.
Chapter 5
Conclusions
This Licentiate Thesis presentes an in-depth investigation of the EEQKD protocol,
which is based on transmitting N -qubit entangled states. It is shown that the
protocol cannot be less secure than the well-known BB84 protocol, on which EEQKD
is based. We have shown that by entangling the qubits optimally, it is possible to
significantly reduce the maximal information provided by an intercept-resend attack
for a given error rate. We have presented an N -qubit gate, U⋆N , which restricts the
information gain of an IR attack to at most 1/(2N).
Chapter 3 discusses the arguably most important figure for a QKD protocol, the
key generation rate, in the case N = 2. A model is developed for the inherent noise
in the quantum channel, and the effect of this noise to the key rate is estimated.
The loss of qubits in the quantum channel also strongly affects the key rate. The
effect is estimated for a 50% loss, roughly corresponding to a transmission distance
of 10km. It is shown that at least for gate parameter values near c = (0, pi
2
, 0), i.e.,
gate U⋆2 , the combined effect of noise and loss makes the error rate prohibitively
large.
The relative key rate was maximized over the entangling gate U2 for various
values of the qubit error rate, taking into account quantum channel noise. Without
qubit loss, the gate C
(
pi
4
, pi
4
, pi
4
)
allows for fastest key generation. The key rate is
between 3% to 35% higher than that of BB84 for typical values of the qubit error
rate, and the difference increases with the error rate. Errors or loss introduced by
the additional equipment of the EEQKD protocol were not taken into account. An
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extensive effort was made to find a gate U2 yielding a higher key rate than BB84 with
noise as well as qubit loss, but no such gate was discovered. This study conclusively
shows that in present day practical applications, BB84 performs better than the
EEQKD protocol—increasing entanglement between consecutive qubits decreases
the key rate.
For highly entangled qubit pairs, the bit errors may be correlated. If this is taken
into account in the protocol, it may reduce the information leaked to an attacker
in the error correction phase. For N = 2, the correlation ideally halves the leaked
information. It is shown in Sec. 3.5.3, that gate U⋆2 could yield a higher key rate
than BB84 for error rate values larger than 10.5%, if full correlation of errors is
assumed. This is in spite of the detrimental effects of quantum channel imperfections
in particular for the gate U⋆2 .
A novel attack against the EEQKD protocol was developed based on an earlier
partial presentation. An attacker is able to reduce the EEQKD protocol to the BB84
protocol at least for the gates U⋆2 and U
⋆
3 . It is expected that the attack generalizes
to an arbitrary value of N , but for values of the gate parameter c2 between 0 and
pi
2
the generalization is unlikely. This is because the absolute values of the amplitudes
of the superposition states are unequal for these gates, and the amplitudes cannot
be altered with the approach discussed. However, the attack may provide more
information than an IR attack for other gates, as well. It is not surprising that the
key to Eve’s overcoming of the inaccessibility to the full multi-qubit entangled state
lies in the equally clever use of entangled qubits.
Although the results in Ch. 2 strongly suggest that the protocol performs better
than the BB84 scheme, the studies regarding the key generation rate, in Ch. 3, in
fact show that the opposite may be true. In practical key distribution applications
at present, one cannot recommend the use of EEQKD over BB84. In the scenario of
very low qubit loss, however, the EEQKD protocol may perform better, especially
if the qubit error rate is relatively high. Furthermore, the attack described in Ch. 4
allows Eve to reduce EEQKD with U⋆N to the plain BB84 scheme, at least in the
case of two or three qubit entanglement. This raises the question whether the attack
can be modified to overcome any entangling gate.
Correlation of bit errors in entangled qubits warrants further study. High correla-
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tion of errors in an N -qubit group would significantly reduce the information leaked
in error correction, which is the main contributor to the decrease in the key rate of
the EEQKD protocol. Unless full correlation is achieved, the protocol needs to be
amended to take the correlation into account properly.
We have shown that full correlation of bit errors could result in a key rate above
that of the BB84 scheme, if the underlying error rate is high. This, however, only
applies to a fairly low value of qubit loss, 50%. In a realistic scenario, the loss is of
the order of 0.999 for transmission distances beyond 100km. Therefore, developing
states robust to qubit loss is a topic for future research. The difficulty here lies in
balancing the need to protect the transmission from an attacker with the need to
tolerate uncontrolled loss of qubits.
In the course of this study, it has become manifest that it is usually beneficial for
an attacker to measure all the qubits of an entangled state, as opposed to measur-
ing only a fraction of qubits in each group. Hence, interleaving and randomizing
the qubits of different entangled groups for the transmission could improve the
information-error ratio. This is yet another topic for future research.
Appendix A
List of Source Code Files
This appendix lists and briefly delineates the files containing the source code used
to perform the calculations presented in this thesis. A more detailed description is
given in each file. File names ending with ’.m’ are scripts or functions for Matlab by
The MathWorks, Inc., and those ending with ’.nb’ are notebooks for Mathematica
by Wolfram Research, Inc.
init2.m initializes the two-qubit BB84 states in the array msg.
applySU2full.m applies a single-qubit gate (SU2 matrix) to one of the qubits of
each pair in the array msg.
A.m applies gate C(c) to each of the states in the array msg.
applySU2.m applies successive z and y rotations to one of the qubits of each pair
in the array msg.
measure1.m gives the single-qubit projective measurement operator for the given
result and basis.
measure2.m gives the two-qubit projective measurement operator for the given
results and bases.
summsgs.m sums over different values of a in the probability matrix of Bob’s
results for given α and e.
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bb84e34.m calculates the mutual information and QBER for given gate parameters
for Alice and Bob’s and Eve’s gates.
slopebb84e34.m returns the slope I(A,E)/q for the given gate parameters for
Alice and Bob and for Eve.
bb84emaxeve34.m maximizes the slope 9 times over Eve’s parameters and returns
the maximal value found.
bb84eminmax34.m minimizes the slope over Alice and Bob’s parameters and
returns the minimal slope and the corresponding parameters.
A3.m applies gate C(c) to the two rightmost states in each three-qubit state given
as a parameter.
bb84e40q.m simulates the protocol under photon loss. The first entangled photon
is replaced with the given state. Returns only the QBER’s of the two qubits
and their average.
applynoise.m applies the noise operator Nxyz to the specified qubit in each of the
pairs in the array msg.
bb84e60.m simulates the protocol under innocent quantum channel noise with a
given amplitude. Returns only the QBER’s of the two qubits and their average.
Hbin.m gives the binary Shannon entropy.
eeqkdrate4.m gives the relative key rate according to Eq. (3.6) for the given gate
parameters, q, and noise amplitude. Assumes 50% qubit loss. The slope s is
maximized.
eeqkdmaxmaxkeyrate4.m maximizes the relative key rate for the given noise
amplitude over the parameters c.
optimrate4.m optimizes the relative key rate for different BB84 QBER’s.
qber.nb contains calculations and plots regarding the key rate with noise and loss.
secret-key rate.nb includes commands to produce the plots in Figs. 3.1 and 3.2.
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eprattack.nb contains calculations needed in the analysis of the entanglement-
enhanced attacks discussed in Ch. 4.
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